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STATEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
Appellant and respondent are the only parties. Previously, 
appellant's adult son, the son's wife, and their three children 
had been plaintiff, but their cases had been settled and disposed 
of prior to trial and the jury herein was advised only of 
appellant and respondent as parties. 
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ISSUES 
The case presents a single issue. Is the jury verdict 
supported by the evidence? If not, it should be reversed. 
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BASIS FOR MOTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed within 14 days of the 
date of decision of the Court of Appeals and is presented in good 
faith and not for delay, pursuant to Rule 35, Court of Appeals. 
This Petition is based on appellant's belief that the Court 
of Appeals has overlooked the factual point of the appeal. 
CITATIONS 
For ease of reference, where possible, citations in this 
Petition are to the Briefs on appeal and this court's opinion. 
The parties are referred to as at the trial, and this court's 
opinion, as plaintiff and defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
The Court's Opinion deals primarily with whether plaintiff, 
Lee Sander's condition of fibrositis was caused by his collision 
with respondent. 
The smaller issue is lost in the larger. 
Plaintiff's cervical strain caused real but transient 
damage. This was overshadowed by the resulting Fibrositis which 
caused permanent disability and major damages. 
It is regretted defendant chose to call two doctors, Drs. 
Barbuto and Spencer, who were not conversant with fibrositis 
(Opinion, page 3, paragraph 3; page 4, paragraph 1; App. Brief, 
pp. 14-23, 29, 33-34), missed its diagnosis and so, not finding a 
physical reason for plaintiff's disability, ascribed his 
complaints to "psychogenic pain," "stress physiology" and a 
desire for "secondary gain" at defendant's expense (Opinion page 
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3, footnotes), i.e., a malingerer trying to turn a minor accident 
into a huge windfall. 
The reason defendant chose not to examine plaintiff by 
doctors who were competent concerning fibrositis was undoubtedly 
that they would concur with Dr. Goka, who specializes in that 
field (App. Brief, p. 9) that from an original cervical strain 
evolved as a sequelae the condition of fibrositis that was 
disabling due to intense pain (App. Brief, pp. 8,9). Such 
testimony confirmed would have led to an appropriate award. 
The court's opinion on facts deals almost entirely with the 
heated trial debate as to fibrositis while paying scant attention 
to the original strain. The jury undoubtedly did the same. 
If the jury had awarded the plaintiff $10,000, the verdict 
would not be appealable. It would then have compensated him for 
the strain, but not for the fibrositis. Within the framework of 
this case that would have been within its province. 
Fortunately, because the jury awarded no damages at all, 
finding defendant caused plaintiff no injury at all, the door is 
open for this court to correct a disturbing trial result. It is 
disturbing because it leaves a working man, disabled by 
defendant's fault, with no remedy, based on testimony which the 
court's opinion indicates is not pleasing but is technically 
adequate to support the juries verdict. 
Plaintiff was concerned that this court might focus on 
fibrositis because he believed that was what the jury had done. 
His concern was increased when defendant filed her Brief which 
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very effectively changed the focus of the appeal from the basic 
fact of plaintiff's original injury, the strain, to the matter of 
its extent, the fibrositis. 
It is perfectly proper tactics for a party to make his 
argument on his strongest point. However, as that was a point 
different from the point of plaintiff's appeal, plaintiff filed a 
Reply Brief specifically setting forth that the issue was the 
original injury, not its extent and detailing the pertinent facts 
with reference to how defendant's brief conceded them. 
Appellant's Reply Brief is annexed for ease of reference, as 
Annex A. 
Let us leave the fibrositis aside and look solely at the 
cervical strain as an injury caused by defendant. If we do so, 
we find no conflict in the evidence. 
The Opinion of the Court does state, at page 5, paragraph 3: 
"On the evidence presented, the jury could 
reasonably have found that plaintiff did not 
carry his burden of proof as to either the 
original cervical sprain or the allegedly 
resulting fibrositis." [Emphasis added. 
Opinion, page 5, paragraph 2] 
It is respectfully submitted that this factual statement of 
this court on review relating to the basic injury, the cervical 
strain, is in error. 
In regard to the Court's determination that plaintiff 
"did not carry his burden of proof as to either the original 
cervical strain ..." the court cites Dr. Barbuto (Opinion, page 
3, paragraph 3), as saying that he found no sign of the original 
injury when he examined plaintiff, and the testimony of Dr. 
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Spencer, (Opinion, page 4, paragraph 2) that he also found no 
sign of original injury when he examined plaintiff. (App. Brief, 
page 15-17) 
This is where this court's opinion errs on the facts as the 
inference is left unexamined in its opinion that such testimony 
indicates plaintiff didn't receive a cervical strain from 
defendant. (Please see discussion at pages 4-5 of the Reply 
Brief.) 
The inference is unsupported because neither Dr. Barbuto nor 
Dr. Spencer was asked if defendant injured plaintiff. (App. 
Brief, page 15; Resp. Brief, pp. 4-5) That question could have 
been asked of them, but was not. 
When a party has the opportunity to elicit evidence on a 
material point and chooses not to, the real inference is that 
that point is yielded. Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 
100; Morton v. Hood, 105 U 484, 143 P.2d 434. 
The testimony of the three doctors who testified, Dr. Goka 
for plaintiff, (App. Brief, p. 7) and Drs. Spencer and Barbuto 
for defendant, all agreed that a cervical strain would heal 
within a three month period. (App. Brief, p. 15) 
Dr. Barbuto examined plaintiff six months after the 
accident. Dr. Spencer examined plaintiff 18 months after the 
accident. (App. Brief, p. 15) 
The testimony of Drs. Barbuto and Spencer was only that they 
found no evidence of an existing cervical strain when they 
examined plaintiff. 
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Their findings that plaintiff did not then exhibit signs of 
a cervical strain had nothing to do with whether he suffered the 
strain at time of the accident, as these same doctors both 
testified it would have healed before they saw him, (App. Brief, 
P. 15) 
Thus, there is no medical testimony that plaintiff did not 
receive the original cervical strain. 
In fact, the only evidence adduced by defendant on the point 
of plaintiff's original injury came in two forms, both favoring 
plaintiff. 
First, defendant testified she left her car, went to 
plaintiff's car and asked him how he was doing, immediately after 
the accident occurred, and that plaintiff told her that he 
thought he had just received a whiplash. This was his immediate 
complaint of pain. (Opinion, page 1, paragraph 3) 
The other evidence introduced by defendant was that of Mr. 
Checka, a rehabilitation specialist employed by defendant. Mr. 
Checka interviewed plaintiff, Dr. Goka, plaintiff's employer, and 
concluded that at that time, plaintiff was progressing to the 
point where he might soon begin to work a 20 hour week and in a 
few months, as he convalesced from the injury, return to full-
time work. (Opinion, page 3, paragraph 1) 
This evidence from Mr. Checka, by defendant concedes the 
fact of the injury as it deals with its fact and with plaintiff's 
convalescence from it. 
As there is no medical evidence defendant did not injure 
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plaintiff, also there is no non-medical evidence of that, but to 
the contrary as shown above defendant's only evidence on point 
confirms the injury. 
The troubling consideration in this court's affirming the 
jury's finding of no injury at all is that at trial defendant did 
not even contest that injury. 
In defendant's entire Reply Brief, there is no statement of 
fact or guotation from the transcript at trial that plaintiff was 
not originally injured as he claimed. (Reply Brief, p. 4) 
The closest defendant came was on appeal. In her Reply 
Brief she stated that the jury "might infer" from the testimony 
of Dr. Barbuto that plaintiff had not been injured at all. 
(Resp. Brief, p. 4) 
If the fact of initial injury had been contested at trial, 
there would have been a direct question defendant put to the 
doctors. "Dr. Barbuto, based on your examination of plaintiff, 
do you have an opinion as to whether he was injured in the 
accident?" 
Granted plaintiff had the duty to carry his own burden of 
evidence. Plaintiff had done so. If defendant then wanted to 
contest the fact, defendant's obligation was to produce rebuttal 
evidence. Defendant chose not to. This is argument, but the 
argument has weight. 
An inference does not stand as a basis for a jury verdict 
when there is substantial direct testimony to the contrary on the 
point. Nelson v. Trijillo, Utah, 657 P.2d 730. (Resp. Brief, p.4) 
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What was plaintiff's positive evidence? It included the 
following: 
1. The collision was sufficiently severe to bend the 
frame of plaintiff's car into its rear tires so that it could not 
be driven but had to be towed from the accident scene, (App. 
Brief, p. 5) 
2. The case title and file show the five other 
occupants of plaintiff's car, his son Eugene, Eugene's wife 
Elise, and their three little children were all injured by the 
collision. They were less injured and all settled before trial, 
so that James Lee Sanders was the only plaintiff at trial. (App. 
Brief, p. 1) When five younger people, with bodies that are 
supposed to be more flexible, are hurt by the collision, it is 
probable that the father-grandfather would be hurt too. 
3. Plaintiff complained of pain immediately to defendant. 
(App. Brief, p. 13) 
4. Plaintiff had had two previous rear-end collisions. He 
volunteered these in opening statement and in his direct 
testimony. (App. Brief, p. 12) 
Both of those were liability cases on the part of the other 
driver and, by coincidence, all three, the first two and 
defendant's accidents were covered by the same insurer. (Reply 
Brief, p. 2) In both of the first two accidents, plaintiff 
submitted a claim for and received payment of damage to his 
vehicle. In neither did he submit a claim for personal injury or 
medical treatment. (App. Brief, p. 12) The first accident 
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occurred in 1981, over a year before the subject accident (not 
1982 as indicated in the Court's Opinion, page 1, paragraph 3. 
App. Brief, p. 12). The second accident occurred a few weeks 
before the collision with defendant, but was minor. Plaintiff 
complained of a stiff neck for a few days but it passed, and he 
received no medical attention. This accident caused him no time 
loss. (App. Brief, p. 12) 
5. At the time the accident occurred, plaintiff was not 
under medical treatment. (App. Brief, p. 13) 
6. Immediately after the accident, plaintiff sought medical 
treatment for his cervical strain. (App. Brief, pp. 6-7) 
7. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was working full 
time. After the accident, plaintiff never returned to work 
fulltime. He was disabled by the time of trial. (App. Brief, 
pp. 6-7) 
8. The accident occurred on a Saturday. On the following 
Monday, plaintiff saw a chiropractor, Dr. Kidman. Dr. Kidman in 
two weeks (App. Brief, p. 6) referred plaintiff to an internist, 
Dr. Gordon Evans, who found defendant had caused plaintiff a 
"whip lash," a cervical strain (App. Brief, p. 11). Dr. Evans 
referred plaintiff on to a neurologist, Dr. Rich, who confirmed 
the cervical strain and its cause by defendant (App. Brief, p. 
11). As plaintiff continued to have trouble after the whiplash 
should have healed, seven months after the accident Dr. Evans 
referred plaintiff to Dr. Goka (App. Brief, p. 7), an M.D. who 
specializes in rehabilitation, that specialty including diagnosis 
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and treatment of fibrositis. Thereafter, and at trial, Dr. Goka 
was plaintiff's attending physician. Dr. Goka reconfirmed the 
cervical strain as caused by defendant. (App. Brief, pp. 7, 11) 
None of this medical evidence as to plaintiff sustaining a 
cervical strain caused by defendant was rebutted. 
Plaintiff's wife testified in detail, as did plaintiff, of 
his prior good health, the instant pain caused him by the 
collision, that while he attempted to stay with the family outing 
he went to bed in the afternoon, spent most of Sunday inactive, 
and saw the chiropractor the first thing Monday. (App. Brief, p. 
4) His ability to work was impaired from the start. He had a 
period of improvement when the strain was healing and the 
fibrositis just beginning, and then his descent into disability 
as the fibrositis progressed (App. Brief, pp. 6-10). While 
plaintiff was impeached on many points—his income, his taxes, 
etc.—there was no impeachment on the above sequence of events 
from the accident onward. Had there been, such would have been 
in defendant's brief on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
In its review of the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence, 
the Court of Appeals makes note of the fact that plaintiff called 
only Dr. Goka as his medical witness and not Dr. Kidman, 
Dr. Evans, nor Dr. Rich. However, without objection Dr. Goka 
read into the record the findings of Dr. Evans and Dr. Rich that 
plaintiff suffered a cervical strain caused by defendant. (App. 
Brief, p. 11) This was evidence of their findings, not just 
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Dr. Goka's., 
At a trial involving medical issues, if each preceding 
doctor, laboratory technician, nurse, and other expert was 
called, trials would be unreasonably long and expensive. The 
most logical, and customary, doctor to call is the then attending 
physician as he is best qualified to testify in necessary detail 
as to present condition and prognosis. He bases the patient's 
history on the reports of the doctors who preceded him. On 
appeal, it is late for defendant to now say the prior doctors 
should have been called. 
Accordingly, Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, adopts 
verbatim the Federal Rule to allow an expert to base his 
testimony on the opinions of others. In his testimony, Dr. Goka 
read from the medical records of Dr. Evans and Dr. Rich, that 
plaintiff had a cervical strain caused by defendant. There was 
no objection to this procedure by defendant. 
Utah cases approve this procedure including Schurtleff v. 
Jay Tuft & Company, (1980) 622 P.2d 1168, State v. Clayton, 
(1982) 646 P.2d 723, Barson v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., (1984) 682 
P.2d 832. See State v. Wade, 251 SE 2d 407 (NC), as specifically 
allowing a medical doctor to base his testimony not only on his 
own findings, but on statements given him by the patient and 
findings of other, prior, doctors. 
Rule 7 03 provides: 
"BASES OF OPINION, TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS: The 
facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by or made known to 
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him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, facts or data 
need not be admissible in evidence," 
Similarly, had there been such rebuttal, plaintiff could 
have called the other plaintiffs in the case and Dr. Evans and 
Dr. Rich. 
The question is whether plaintiff's evidence on the cervical 
strain is adequate to justify reversal of the jury's finding that 
defendant did not injure plaintiff. 
To tie this Petition back to plaintiff's brief on appeal, 
plaintiff restates his argument there at page 24: 
"1. A verdict must be supported by evidence that is (a) 
substantial and (b) competent. Christensen v. Shear, 
Utah Supreme Court, No. 19679; filed 8-10-84; Watters 
v. Querrv, Utah, 626 P.2d 455 (1981); E. A. Strout 
Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 
Utah, 665 P.2d 1320 (1983)." 
M2. If it seems clear the jury has misunderstood or 
misapplied the evidence, its verdict should be set 
aside. Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 
(1958) (concurring opinion)." 
"3. A verdict cannot be based on speculative evidence. 
Nelson v. Truiillo, Utah, 657 P.2d 730 (1982)." 
"Application of these three criteria to the evidence 
shows what caused the jury to go amiss." 
Criteria 1 - Was plaintiff's evidence substantial and 
competent? 
Each of the nine factors listed in the Statement of Facts 
herein meets both criteria. Cumulatively, and unrebutted, they 
are more than adequate. 
This case is the reverse image of Christensen v. Shear, 
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supra. There, plaintiff concealed previous accidents causing 
major injuries. Here, defendant had full access to plaintiff's 
prior accidents (App. Brief, p. 13) and produced no evidence of 
medical expense or time loss. Only a sore neck for a few days. 
Should plaintiff's neck have been rendered unusually 
susceptible to injury by the prior accidents is of no moment as a 
matter of law, because a party who aggravates a pre-existing 
condition is responsible for the aggravation, and as plaintiff 
had no time loss nor medical expense until defendant hit him, all 
of his special damages relate to that — her hitting him. 
Biswell v. Duncan/ 64 Utah A.W.Rep. 36, 40. 
Criteria 2 - Did the jury misunderstand the evidence? 
The purpose of plaintiff's going into detail in his original 
brief on the testimony about fibrositis (Brief pp. 7-11, 14-23, 
26-38; Reply Brief, pp. 3-6) was to explain two factors adequate 
to cause the jury to misunderstand. 
First, as this court may have been misled, the jury may have 
been by the phrasing of the questions put to Drs. Barbuto and 
Spencer that inferred plaintiff had no original injury, when on 
close reading they never so testified. (Brief, pp. 29-33; Reply 
Brief, p. 5) 
Second, if the jury felt plaintiff was overreaching, it 
could have decided to punish him by awarding him nothing. 
(Brief, p. 33; Reply Brief, pp. 5-6) 
As plaintiff stated in his brief at pages 33-34: 
"It was only on cross-examination that plaintiff found 
first as to Dr. Barbuto and then as to Dr. Spencer that 
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they weren't qualified to diagnose fibrositis. By then 
their testimony on secondary gain, compensated accident 
setting (R 671, L14-R 672, L10), and such, was in. The 
bell cannot be unrung once rung. Their testimony also 
was admissible having some probative value as to the 
degree of plaintiff's physical impairment. Evidence 
admissible as competent on one point, is not barred 
because not competent on another point. State v. 
Cooper, 114 U 531, 201 P2d 764. 29 AmJur Evidence, Sec. 
262, page 310." 
"Accordingly, the jurors heard the doctors testify that 
plaintiff was not hurt, (R 763, L6-10), that the only 
doctor he needed was a psychiatrist, (R 765, L2-R 766, 
L2), and that he was probably motivated by an urge for 
secondary gain, (R 676, L22-R 688, L19), before they 
ever heard the cross-examination showing that the 
doctors lacked foundation." 
"The cross-examination may well have come too late. 
Many of us hear enough on a point to make up our minds 
and then we go to sleep, or our minds otherwise close. 
Republicans accuse democrats of this and vice versa." 
Criteria 3 - A jury's verdict cannot be based on speculative 
evidence. 
On the facts submitted, isn't it fair to say that 
plaintiff's evidence was real enough? It was defendant's 
evidence—if plaintiff did not show the strain six and eighteen 
months later, maybe he did not have it—that was speculative. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiff prays this case be remanded for new trial on the 
issue of damages and that he recover his costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING </ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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This Reply Brief is filed because Respondent's 
Brief on Appeal is a powerful and compelling document- Its 
arguments were presented to the jury and could well have led 
to the jury's finding that Appellant, plaintiff, Mr. 
Sanders, suffered no injury at all at the hands of 
respondent. The problem is that these arguments could well, 
as appellant insists, have misled the jury. 
This appeal is on a single point — the jury erred 
when it said respondent did not injure appellant. 
Appellant's point is that respondent's arguments go 
only to the amount of damages, not to their basic 
existence. 
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the evidence was 
uncontradicted that appellant had been receiving no medical 
attention for injuries, and lost no time from work before 
respondent struck his car. This is not rebutted in 
Respondent's Brief to any degree. 
Appellant's evidence was similarly uncontradicted 
that immediately on the happening of that accident, he 
suffered pain, and on the Monday following the accident 
(which occurred on a Saturday), started an uninterrupted 
course of medical treatment to deal with that injury. This 
also is not rebutted in Respondent's Brief. 
-1-
Although respondent was fully advised as to the 
facts of the appellant's two prior accidents, not a word of 
testimony was ever introduced that appellant had in fact had 
any medical expense or time loss from those or any other 
prior injury or accident. 
A piece of evidence of almost controlling weight is 
that the first two auto accidents plaintiff was involved in 
were clear liability cases -- plaintiff was rearended both 
times. In both he filed claim for, and received, payment 
for the damage to his car- In both he filed no claim for 
injury nor medical expense. 
Plaintiff did not know defendant would be the third 
person to rearend him. He is an insurance agent. If either 
accident had caused him personal injury, he would have filed 
claim for personal damages as well as property damages. 
This evidence was before the jury (R 433, L9-14; 
434, L15-R436, L3). It was competant evidence that 
plaintiff received no injury of substance from either prior 
accident. There was no rebuttal. 
These are the key points on the basic issue -- did 
respondent injure appellant? That is, plaintiff is injured, 
yet there is no evidence of any prior injury causing work 
loss or medical expense. 
-2-
The fact that appellant was injured by respondent 
was verified by the testimony of Dr. Goka who incorporated 
into his testimony the medical records of Dr. Evans and Dr. 
Rich, who saw appellant promptly after his accident. 
Respondent argues this evidence is insufficient, but no 
objection was made by respondent at trial to this form of 
using one doctor to cover the findings of several. It 
nappens frequently in cases such as this, where 
complications following an injury require referral to a 
specialist who then becomes the attending physician, and who 
then becomes the live medical witness used in court, as here 
Dr. Evans referred appellant first to Dr. Rich, and then to 
Dr. Goka who testified. 
Whether appellant did or did not have fibrositis 
caused by the accident is not an issue on original injury. 
It is an issue on aggravation, the amount of damages only. 
The initial injury respondent caused appellant was described 
oy appellant's doctors as a moderately severe cervical 
strain. (R.526r L. 22-R.527, L.14; R.582, L.9-R.583, L.3) 
This is not by itself a permanently disabling condition. 
The problem is, according to appellant's experts, not only 
Dr. Goka but also the prestigious St. Luke's Hospital in 
Phoenix, Arizona, fibrositis can, and in appellant's case 
did, arise from a cervical strain. (R.525, L.18-R. 526, 
L.21; R.547, L.21-R.548, L.12) 
-3-
Plaintiff's original injury r>y defendant as 
diagnosed by Drs. Evans, Rich and Goka was never directly 
impeached- Defendant did not present any records or doctors 
showing any error in their original diagnosis, or medical 
treatment relating to other injuries. No such evidence 
existed as plaintiff had no other injury causing medical 
expense or work loss-but only a temporarily sore neck about 
which ne did not see a doctor caused by the second 
rearender. (R. 434, L.15-R. 436, L.3). 
In Respondent's Brief, respondent implicitly admits 
this. 
At P. 36 of that brief, the brief states: 
,fFrom Dr. Barbuto1 s testimony alone, the 
jury could reasonably infer Sanders was 
not injured in the accident of September 
25, 1982." [Emphasis added.] 
As stated under the Utah cases in Appellant's Brief, 
(pages 23-24, 27-29, 36-38), there has to be substantial 
evidence, rather than mere inference, to overcome solid 
substantial evidence on a point. 
In fact, at trial, the reality of appellant's having 
oeen injured by respondent, so that the real issues were 
damages and liability, is evidenced by the form respondent's 
counsel used in examining his own doctors, Drs. Barbuto and 
Spencer. Neither Dr. Barbuto nor Dr. Spencer*were ever asked 
by respondent's counsel if appellant had been injured by 
respondent at all. Rather, the questions put to them 
-4-
assumed the fact of the injury and asked about 
convalescence. 
When Dr. Barbuto was asked about appellant's 
original injury, he was asked only if it had healed at the 
time Dr. Barbuto examined him. 
,fQ. ... Did you form an opinion as to 
whether that had healed? iR. 672, 
L.15-15) 
Similarly, when Dr. Spencer was asked about 
appellant's condition at the time when Dr. Spencer examined 
him, the form of the question was this: 
MQ. (By Mr. Burton) Now, assuming that Mr. 
Sanders felt the symptoms he described to 
you, do you have an opinion whether or not 
the accident was the cause of the 
symptoms?" (R.756, L.7-11) 
This question did not ask whether respondent had 
injured plaintiff. It asked if the symptoms that appellant 
described to Dr. Spencer 18 months after the accident were 
caused by the accident. 
Thus the lengthy and harmful testimony of Drs. Barbuto 
and Spencer didn't rebut at all plaintiff's medical proof of 
the original injury. They simply were never asked about that. 
The original injury was conceded by not being challenged. 
Their testimony went only to the persistence of the original 
injury as being motivated by plaintiff's desire for economic 
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qain. This was unfair, as neither doctor was capable of 
diagnosing fibrositis (See Appellant's Brief, pages 16-23, 
29-36), which, if properly diagnosed, explained plaintiff's 
pain and disability on an objective medical basis 
(Appellant's Brief, pages 7-11, 25-26), not a "psychogenic'1 
oasis as Drs. Barbuto and Spencer called it. 
Nevertheless, what the jury heard from them was 
that plaintiff was a malingerer* If believed, and it 
apparently was, this could lead the jury to award plaintiff 
no damages, thereby punishing him for overreaching. 
An injured plaintiff is not a criminal. Appellant 
was in his 50s when the subject accident occurred and had, 
of course, 50 years history behind him — he had prior 
nealth problems, his first wife had died leaving him to 
raise five children, he had had a short second marriage 
which ended in divorce, he was married a third time at the 
time of the accident, and his insurance agency wasn't 
setting course records. Any person could be impeached on 
all the precise details of exactly what's in a tax return, 
accountings, the date of a wife's layoff from a job, etc. 
Respondent did this with great skill. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests his original brief be reread. 
While there are clearly many points of factual dispute 
oetween the parties at trial and now in their briefs on 
appeal, the record is uncontradicted that the only evidence 
oefore the jury was that appellant was injured by defendant 
oy hitting him hard enough to bend the frame of his car into 
the rear wheels making his car undriveable (Appellant's 
Brief, pages 5-6), that he was up to then working full-time, 
nad immediate medical expense thereafter, and that he had no 
prior medical expense nor time loss for injury. Thus, it is 
clear that the jury confused the amount of damages, or the 
medical testimony denegrating his convalescence, with the 
fact of injury. Its verdict stating that respondent caused 
plaintiff no injury is wrong. 
DATED June 18, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
Attorney for Appellant 
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